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Support Units

Support units are units whose primary function is to support offshore installations. They are normally engaged in one or more of the following functions: crane operations, fire-fighting, diving operations, maintenance, construction, pipelaying and accommodation. Source: Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, Part 1, Regulations, June 2013, Lloyd’s Register, Global Standards

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Semi-submersible or Column-stabilised Units

Semi-submersible or column-stabilised units have working platforms supported on widely spaced buoyant columns. The columns are normally attached to buoyant lower hulls or pontoons. These units are normally floating types but can be designed to rest on the sea bed, see also 2.2.3. Source: Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, Part 1, Regulations, June 2013, Lloyd’s Register, Global Standards

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Ship Units

Ship units are self-propelled surface type units of shipshaped single or multiple hull form. Source: Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, Part 1, Regulations, June 2013, Lloyd’s Register, Global Standards

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Surface Type Units

Surface type units are units with a ship or barge type displacement hull of single or multiple hull construction intended for operation in the floating condition. Source: Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, Part 1, Regulations, June 2013, Lloyd’s Register, Global Standards

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Self-propelled

Self-propelled means that the unit is designed for unassisted sea passages and is fitted with propelling machinery in accordance with LR Rules. Source: Rules and Regulations for the Classification of Mobile Offshore Units, Part 1, Regulations, June 2013, Lloyd’s Register, Global Standards

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Self-propelled Installation

an installation that is certified to navigate independently. Source: Atlantic Canada Offshore Petroleum Industry, Standard Practice for the Training and Qualifications of Personnel, 2013, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Global Standards

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Semi-submersible Installation

a drilling installation with the main deck connected to an underwater hull or hulls by columns or caissons. Source: Atlantic Canada Offshore Petroleum Industry, Standard Practice for the Training and Qualifications of Personnel, 2013, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Global Standards

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SLB

Strength Level Blast. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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SCI

Steel Construction Institute. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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SFPE

Society of Fire Protection Engineers. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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Safe Mustering Area

An area of the platform that will enable the occupants to survive the defined fire or blast event. The area must also be safely accessible by personnel not in the immediate vicinity of the event and provide access to the primary escape route. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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Survival

For purposes of fire and blast consideration, survival means demonstration that at least one escape route and the temporary refuge or safe mustering area are maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow platform evacuation and emergency response procedure, in accordance with the safety philosophy defined by the owner/operator of the platform. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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Surface Emissive Power (SEP)

The heat radiated outwards from a flame per unit surface area of the flame. Units are kW/m². Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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SEP

Surface Emissive Power. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards

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Specific Heat

The amount of heat, measured in Joules, required to raise the temperature of one kilogram of a substance by one degree C. Units are Joules/kg/ºC. Source: API RP 2FB, Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast Loading, First Edition, April 2006. Global Standards  

Specific Heat

Heat required to raise a unit mass of a substance one degree. Source: IADC UBO / MPD Glossary, December 2011. Global Standards

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SSSV System Equipment

components which include the surface-control system, control line, SSSV, safety valve lock, safety valve landing nipple, flow couplings and other downhole control components [SOURCE: ISO 10417] Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Subsurface-controlled Subsurface Safety Valve SSCSV

SSSV actuated by the characteristics of the well itself Note 1 to entry: Note 1 to entry: These devices are usually actuated by the differential pressure through the SSCSV (velocity type) or by tubing pressure at the SSCSV (high or low pressure type). [SOURCE: ISO 14723] Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Surface-controlled Subsurface Safety Valve SCSSV

SSSV controlled from the surface by hydraulic, electrical, mechanical or other means Note 1 to entry: The SCSSV is sometimes called DHSV (downhole safety valve). [SOURCE: ISO 14723] Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Subsea Isolation Valve

SSIV SIV valve which closes within a defined time limit derived from the risk assessment in order to reduce consequences of pipeline/riser leak or rupture Note 1 to entry: The SSIV can be an actuated valve (e.g. remotely controlled subsea valve) or a non-activated valve (subsea check valve). An activated valve is normally designed as fail safe (i.e. closes and remains closed on all failures external to the valve and actuator themselves). Note 2 to entry: Where the flexible risers are connected directly to the subsea wellhead, the master and wing valve may be considered to represent the SSIV function. [SOURCE: ISO 14723] Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Spurious Action

result of a spurious activation of a safety function Note 1 to entry: A spurious safety action is not necessary safe. An example of spurious action is a spurious trip. Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Spurious Activation (of a safety function)

untimely demand of a safety function when this is not needed Note 1 to entry: The spurious activation of a safety function may be due to the occurrence of one or several safe failures. Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Staggered Testing (of redundant items)

test of several items with the same test interval but not at the same time EXAMPLE Figure 9 shows staggered tests for two item A and B. Note 1 to entry: When the redundant components of a system are tested at the same time (i.e. when the tests are synchronous) their availabilities are good (just after a test) and bad (just before a test) at the same time. This correlation means that the unavailabilities of the components peak simultaneously. This has a detrimental effect on the system availability which can be cancelled by de-synchronizing the tests. A practical way to do that is staggering the tests (e.g. testing one component in the middle of the test interval of the other); the unavailability peaks are also staggered and this improves the average availability of the system.   Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards

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Systemic Failure

holistic failure failure at system level which cannot be simply described from the individual component failures of the system Note 1 to entry: Systemic/holistic principles have been concisely summarized by Aristotle by “The whole is more than the sum of its parts”. Note 2 to entry: Components have only failure modes. Those failure modes become dangerous, safe or spurious only when the components are implemented into a safety “system”. This is why dangerous, safe or spurious failures are typical systemic failures. For example the failure “fail to close” of a valve is dangerous only if it belongs to a safety system closing this valve on demand. Otherwise this failure mode does not matter. Note 3 to entry: “Systematic” failures (i.e. occurring in a deterministic way when given conditions are encountered, see 3.2.17) and “systemic” failures should not be confused. Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards  

Systemic Failure

failure that consistently occurs under particular conditions of handling, storage or use Note 1 to entry: The cause of a systematic failure originates in the specification, design, manufacture, installation, operation or maintenance. Its occurrence is precipitated by particular conditions of handling, storage, use or maintenance (see Figure G.3) Note 2 to entry: Corrective maintenance without modification will usually not eliminate the failure cause. Note 3 to entry: A systematic failure can be reproduced by deliberately applying the same conditions, e.g. in verifying the failure cause (from IEC 60050–191 ed3[14]). Systematic failures are non-random failures (see 3.2.16). Note 4 to entry: In operation, a systematic failure is a manifestation of a systematic fault (i.e. a pre-existing state of the system). Note 5 to entry: The software systematic failures, called “bugs”, are example of systematic failures: they are due to pre-existing bugs (i.e. faults) and they occur when the input data activate them. Note 6 to entry: Systematic and systemic (which means “at system level”) failures (see 3.2.8) should not be confused. [SOURCE: IEC 60050‑191]   Source: ISO/TR 12489:2013(E) Reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems. Global Standards